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The aim of this paper is to explain differences in growth rates of labour produc-
tivity across countries and over time through changes in technological knowledge.
Both formal theorists and empirical scholars have always been interested in economic
growth differences, as these affect the standards of living. On the empirical side, eco-
nomic historians like David (1991), Mokyr (1990) and Abramovitz (1991) are con-
vinced of the crucial role technology has played since the First Industrial Revolution
started around the turn of the 18th century, the beginning of the period of “modern”
growth. In their opinion, technological progress is path-dependent, as it is a learning
and feedback mechanism, dependent on the specific characteristics of the economy
(Abramovitz, 1991). Furthermore, diffusion of knowledge takes place only gradually
(Salter, 1966) and varies across countries and over time (Gerschenkron, 1962). A
second group of empirical scholars are the growth accountants like Denison (1967)
and Maddison (1995a), who try to calculate with a Solovian type growth model the
contribution of various economic forces, among which capital accumulation, on pro-
ductivity growth. The residual in this model, the so called Abramovitz Residual or
Total Factor Productivity, is sometimes labeled as “technical change” (Solow, 1957).
The growth accounts thus deal with technology as a purely exogenous variable. More-
over, “... accounting by itself cannot generate causal inferences” (Aghion and Howitt,
1998, p.416). Therefore a part of the productivity growth differences cannot be ex-
plained within this framework, and the residual remains a “measure of our ignorance”
(Abramovitz, 1991).
In contrast, modern endogenous growth models attempt to endogenize technol-
ogy. They explain growth differences through deliberate efforts to develop new prod-
ucts and technology. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Judd (1985), Romer (1990), Gross-
man and Helpman (1990, 1991), Aghion and Howitt (1998) and others contributed to
the development of models in which imperfect competition with innovation-based
growth combined with learning-by-doing results in spillovers from industrial re-
search. These spillovers drive a wedge between private and social returns on Research
and Development (R&D). This is an approach which according to Solow “. . . has an
air of promise and excitement about it. . . ” (Solow, 1994, p.52), since it models the
interaction between technological change and labour productivity growth.
The value added of the current paper lies in the explicit application and estimation
of an endogenous growth model and the use of a data set in which the time series of
the variables are internationally comparable. This paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion 2 gives an overview of previous efforts to estimate the contribution of techno-
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logical change to productivity growth. The subsequent section is theoretical in nature
and focuses on the importance of knowledge accumulation for long-run sustainable
growth (Section 3). It describes the main assumptions of the benchmark model of
growth and trade in which technology drives growth. The model will be used as a
starting point for the empirical part of this paper. Section 4 describes the construction
of the data, while Section 5 presents and discusses the estimation results. Section 6
concludes.
2 A review of spillover studies
Nothwithstanding the encouraging development in formal theory, the empirical ba-
sis of these new growth models is still very thin. Various scholars already tried to
estimate the contribution of R&D to productivity, either in levels or in growth rates.
These studies use different methodologies and data, so that the outcomes are vary-
ing and comparison is difficult. We will concentrate on the results and especially on
international spillovers between industrialized countries.
The subject of international spillovers is interesting as it lies in the nature of
knowledge to diffuse across national borders (Keely and Quah, 1998, p.24). Intrana-
tional spillovers (i.e. inter- and intraindustry spillovers within an economy) have been
scrutinized more often by micro- or meso-level studies like those of Wolff and Nadiri
(1993). The interest in international spillovers revived after Grossman and Helpman
(1991) emphasized the importance of openness and the distinction between interna-
tional and intranational knowledge flows. Then the idea of geographical localization
came to the forefront again, and applied in, for instance, Jaffe et al. (1993). However,
evidence for international spillovers remained relatively weak compared to that of
intranational spillovers. Some scholars even calculated that intranational spillovers
exceed international spillovers significantly. One of them is Branstetter (1996), who
used microlevel data in order to estimate intranational spillovers. He considered this
as the proof for endogenous growth theory, as multiple equilibria arise and growth
differences then persist. In another study, Lichtenberg (1992) found that there are no
complete, or no instantaneous international R&D spillovers.
Nevertheless, despite the mixed results, the evidence tends to confirm the exis-
tence of international spillovers. Many studies estimated that the contribution of for-
eign R&D to domestic productivity is large. In a highly influential article, Coe and
Helpman (1995) found that, in a sample of 22 countries, both domestic and foreign
R&D contribute significantly to TFP. Moreover, foreign R&D is becoming more im-
portant over time, especially for smaller countries. Finally, Coe and Helpman found
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that about one quarter of the returns from R&D in the seven largest countries are
accrued to their trading partners. Criticism on these results came from among others
Keller (1997a). He found that the composition of imports played no particular role in
estimating positive and large spillovers, although he argued this did not imply that dif-
fusion of embodied technology is not trade-related. In another paper, Keller (1997b)
modelled general spillovers versus trade-related spillovers from R&D and calculated
that international trade contributed 20 per cent of the total impact on productivity
from foreign R&D. He also found that the contribution of foreign R&D varied across
countries, and that a country’s own R&D was more important than that of the average
foreign economy. Finally, Keller had tried to disentangle embodied and disembodied
technology, but this appeared to be difficult. Technology can be embodied in traded
goods and intermediates, but can also flow disembodied via investments, or via in-
ternational communication networks. In his opinion, alternative channels should be
included, such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).
Lichtenberg and Van Pottelsberghe (1996) included FDI flows, both inward and
outward. The latter is considered as a proxy for technology sourcing, which is often
done by multinationals. Using a new weighting scheme for foreign R&D and a part
of the sample of Coe and Helpman (1995), Lichtenberg and Van Pottelsberghe (1996)
found that domestic R&D is important (especially for the larger countries), like Coe
and Helpman did, although with lower elasticities to output. With respect to foreign
R&D, the channels of imports and technology sourcing are playing a significant role
while inward FDI does not. The latter result may be explained by the fact that multi-
nationals are aiming for own benefits and not international technology transfer per se.
The rate of returns on foreign R&D via the other two channels are very high. Finally,
the impact of technology sourcing is larger for many industrialized countries via the
American R&D stock than via imports from the USA.
On the industry-level, Bernstein and Mohnen (1998) scrutinized R&D intensive
sectors in the USA and Japan and their effects on each other’s production structure
and productivity. Over a short period, R&D appears to complement international
spillovers, but over a longer period, the results differ between the USA and Japan.
The latter’s R&D intensity decreases then. Furthermore, American R&D affects the
productivity growth of Japanese industries more strongly (60 per cent of the growth is
attributable to the American influence) than the other way around (20 per cent in par-
ticular). Finally, social rates of return appear to be high again (3,5 to 4 times greater
than the private return, which amounts about 17 per cent in both countries). How-
ever, this is not out of line as can be seen from Nadiri’s (1993) overview of empirical
studies on rates of return to R&D.
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Park (1995) distinguished government and private R&D like Lichtenberg (1992),
but used a panel data set instead of cross-country data. Furthermore, Park calculated
the amounts of two kinds of spillovers, namely into production and into research.
Foreign R&D appeared to spill over via the domestic production function to produc-
tivity growth, whether the USA is included into the sample (of 10 OECD countries
over the period 1970–1991) or not. However, the effect of foreign R&D on domestic
R&D is only observable when American R&D is included. This is not surprising, as
the USA carries out the bulk of world R&D. Like Lichtenberg (1992), Park (1995)
found that once foreign private R&D is accounted for, foreign government-funded
R&D is insignificant to productivity growth. However, foreign public R&D affects it
indirectly via domestic private R&D, as public R&D is often basic research and does
not have direct impact on growth rates.
Nadiri and Kim (1996) analyzed the effect of R&D spillovers on TFP growth in
the seven largest economies (G7) in the period 1965–1991. They criticized Coe and
Helpman (1995) and Park (1995) in that they were not able to distinguish the pro-
ductivity effect of R&D spillovers from the factor bias effect. Furthermore, they ac-
counted for country-specific effects. The results indicate that benefits from spillovers
differ across countries, where the domestic R&D is relatively important for the USA.
The spillovers from American research on one another’s productivity growth are size-
able, while reversely only Canada and Japan have some influence on American eco-
nomic growth. In narrowing the productivity gaps during the period under consider-
ation, the international spillovers appear to have played a minor role. Furthermore,
capital and R&D spillovers appear to substitute each other, while domestic R&D and
international spillovers complement each other. Nadiri and Kim (1996) conclude that
not only trade, but also the absorptive capacity of a country to utilize foreign knowl-
edge is crucial.
Other studies did not focus on R&D, but on (international) patenting activity as
a measure of knowledge accumulation and diffusion. Keely and Quah (1998) argued
that intellectual property rights matter as a patent system can provide ex ante eco-
nomic incentives although they generate ex post inefficiencies (p.16). However, the
exact nature of the relationship of patents with productivity and R&D is not com-
pletely understood. An appropriate approach would be to consider patents as an out-
put of the invention process generated by private R&D (Keely and Quah, 1998, p.21–
22). An empirical study with patent data is that of Eaton and Kortum (1996). They
argue that R&D expenditures are an input in the innovation process while patents are
an indirect measure of research output, and “...where patent protection is sought re-
flects where inventors expect their ideas to be used” (p.252). They use a cross-section
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of 19 OECD countries, with patent applications by reporting country and country
of residence of the inventor in 1988, and estimate a simultaneaous equations model.
They found that productivity levels rather than growth rates explain a country’s abil-
ity to adopt or innovate. Furthermore, international diffusion rates are about half of
the domestic ones on average. They also estimate that the contribution of the USA
to productivity growth worldwide is sizeable, followed by Japan and Germany. The
latter affects European economies more whereas Japan’s influence is observable else-
where. Nothwithstanding the high rates of diffusion, barriers (e.g., in the institutional
area) are still large enough to let productivity differences to persist. Finally, it appears
that human capital (in the form of education and research scientists and engineers)
is crucial for the ability to adopt, next to trade links and distance (or geographical
localization). The importance of human capital and learning is thus confirmed again
(see for instance, Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994). The results on trade supports the out-
come of the study by Coe and Helpman (1995) mentioned earlier. In another study,
Eaton and Kortum (1997) also include research (in particular, research employment)
into a growth model next to patenting activity in order to explain productivity differ-
ences. This is a new step forward as the above discussed studies did not incorporate
both variables. Their results indicate that foreign research is two-third as potent as
domestic research. Furthermore, the USA and Japan together are again driving the
bulk of growth in the sample (of five large industrialized countries). However, Eaton
and Kortum (1997) used a cross-section data set and no panel data.
To summarize, empirical studies on labour productivity growth and technology
produce various outcomes. Some of them estimate reduced form equations or growth
regressions in which technology is exogenous. Caballero and Jaffe (1993) explicitly
applied an endogenous growth model using patent data. However, they did not con-
sider international diffusion. We have to develop and test models that are capable of
explaining processes of growth and international spillovers.
3 Model
In this section, we formulate a multi-country, multi-sector model with international
technology spillovers and catch-up in the spirit of work by Aghion and Howitt (1998).
The empirical studies discussed in Section 2 give a handle on important research
subjects. First, international spillovers are not complete and growth differences will
persist (Keely and Quah, 1998, p.26). But both international and intranational spill-
overs play a role, and will occur via different channels such as trade and FDI. The
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distinction between disembodied and embodied technology is not made in the current
paper, but this distinction would be interesting in future research.
Second, both patenting activity as a proxy for knowledge flows and R&D expendi-
tures should be incorporated into an empirical growth model. Cameron (1996) argued
that the Aghion and Howitt model needs to be extended with knowledge spillovers
from other countries next to domestic R&D. We proxy these spillovers by patents.
Some studies discussed above indicated that domestic R&D is crucial in order to
be able to absorb new foreign technology. One of the results in our estimations in
Section 5 is that domestic R&D works indirectly on productivity growth in a posi-
tive way. A country needs a certain knowledge basis to be able to adopt and learn
from new knowledge from abroad in the form of patents. Thus we may consider
R&D-expenditures as the input in the innovation process and patents as the output
(see Griliches, 1990). Note that the R&D expenditures are privately-funded (Busi-
ness Enterprise R&D). The differences in patenting activity in the various countries
can indicate whether the national technological state of art enables a country to catch
up with the “technological leader”. This is in our case the USA. Moreover, in the
discussed studies, the research in the USA appeared to affect other economies’ pro-
ductivity growth significantly, but not evenly across countries. We thus also account
for country-specific effects.
Third, we also looked for differences in the effect of R&D expenditures and
patenting activity on labour productivity growth between the aggregate economy and
manufacturing, as a more disaggregated analysis can provide valuable insights in the
process of research and diffusion. Finally, we agree with Crafts’ (1997) remark that
the mixed results of empirical studies on economic growth “...clearly underlines the
need for growth economists to devote more time to the construction of data...” (p.60),
because the results of these studies are sensitive to the data used. For the construction
of proxies of the economic variables in the model, we built a new data set for the
USA, UK, France and Germany, and present the resulting time series in Section 4.
The model we use here draws heavily on Aghion and Howitt (1998, Ch.12) and
it is driven by product differentiation, quality improvements and research spillovers.
The underlying theory allows new intermediate products to open up, as in Romer’s
horizontal innovations model (Romer, 1990), which are then subject to quality im-
provements as in Young’s vertical innovations model (Young, 1998).
In order to be able to test the model using aggregate data it is shown that, with
some convenient assumptions, the production function on the aggregate level can be
written as a Cobb-Douglas production function. We will briefly discuss the underly-
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ing theoretical structure of the model and discuss technological progress and the role
of spillovers in some more detail.
Basically the model is a multi-country model. In each country we have three sec-
tors:1
1. an R&D-sector producing blueprints (or patents A) for new products i using
primary resources and previous accumulated knowledge, home and abroad;
2. an intermediate-goods sector monopolized by the holder of a patent to the latest
generation of differentiated product xit using capital Kit , according to produc-
tion function
xit D Kit=Ait
where Ait is the productivity parameter of latest version of intermediate prod-
uct i. Here we assume that successive vintages of the intermediate product
are produced by increasingly capital intensive techniques. Profit maximizing
implies that all sectors supply a common amount of output, as is shown, for
instance, in Aghion and Howitt (1998, p. 95).
3. a consumer-goods sector producing final output Yt using technology, labour









L1−t ; 0 <  < 1
where Qt is the number of differentiated products. Brands xi substitute well for
each other: the elasticity of substitution between every pair of available brands
" equals 1=.1 − / > 1.
Resources devoted to R&D which improve the quality of existing products (vertical
innovations) contribute over time to productivity in the production of final goods as
well as to the stock of knowledge. Immitation of ‘old’ products increases the number
of differentiated products Qt (horizontal innovations) but does not add to the social
knowledge pool. In short: innovation generates growth and immitation spreads the re-
search input over more sectors. Consumers maximize utility, which they derive from
a set of differentiated products, over an infinite horizon given their budget constraint.
1In our model, multi-country spillovers only matter in the specification of technological progress,
so we introduce the index denoting a specific country when we discuss technological progress.
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To avoid the scale effect of R&D, the number of sectors Qt grows at the same rate
as the number of workers Lt , that is Lt=Qt is constant. Basically, it is assumed that
immitation is a serendipitous process. This means that imitation just happens: no one




D Lt;  > 0
which asymptotically converges to a constant l  Lt=Qt .2 The coefficient  is called
the “immitation rate”. Each sector requires Kit D Aitxit units of capital, and capital-








Profit maximizing implies that all sectors produce the same amount of output, i.e.














Define the capital stock per efficiency unit of labour as kt  Kt=.AtLt/. The common
amount of output of each sector can now be calculated as
xit D xt D Kt
AtQt
D kt l









D AtLtf .kt /
where
f .kt/ D kt
2If dQt=dt D Lt and dLt=dt D gLLt , where gL is the rate of growth of the number of workers,
then dQt =Qt D dLt=Lt implies that  l D gL.
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Summarizing, there is a stock of capital Kt embodied in machines. New capital is
produced at rate It . Capital, consumption and research are produced by labour Lt and
intermediate goods xit :








where kt is defined as the capital stock per efficiency unit of labour (Kt=.AtLt/)
and Qt is the number of intermediate goods that have been created by an immitator.
The flow intermediate products is such that the ratio of Q over L is constant. Capital-
market equilibrium and the production function of final output produces the aggregate
Cobb-Douglas production function. Finally, defining gt as the growth rate of labour
productivity 1 ln Yt − 1 ln Lt , the basic equation in rates of growth is
gt D gA;t C dkt=dt
kt
(1)
3.1 Output per efficiency unit
The second term on the right-hand side is the rate of growth of output per efficiency





− (gA;t C gL;t





 C gA;t C gL;t
 (2)
where it  It=Kt , and It is gross investment.
3.2 Technological progress
Define OAt as the “leading-edge technology parameter”, that is the technology used by
the “technological leader”. Assume that the ratio of the leading-edge technology and
the average technology of a follower-country t  OAt=At converges to a constant,
say 1 C  . This implies that in the long run:
g OA D gA
Furthermore only innovations add to the stock of knowledge and innovations replace
an existing technology with the leading-edge technology. The flow of innovations









D t .t − 1/ (3)




where again  is the arrival rate of innovations and  is the impact of innovations, or
the “size parameter”.3
3.3 Spillovers
Sofar the model can be thought of being applicable to all countries j considered.
Now, we introduce phenomena like convergence, international spillovers, and tech-
nological leadership in the model. More specifically, we do so by focusing on the
rate of technology progress, giA  1 ln Ai . Above it was assumed that the flow of
innovations depends on the arrival rate of innovations t and the change of technol-
ogy OAt − At , now we take a bit different approach to arrive at a testable specification
given the data available. In the process, inevitably, we have to make some ad hoc
assumptions.
















D t − t
 OAt − At
At
!
D t − t .t − 1/
So
gA D g OA D t D g C t . − 1/
and in the long run when g D 0,  D 1 C  .
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then !k D 1, so ln OAt D ln Akt . It is assumed that, in the long run, OAt=Ajt converges
to a constant, that is4
ln Ajt − ln OAt D zj
This implies that, in the long run, gA D g OA. Now suppose that the change in the level
of technology in country j depends on the technological gap with the leader:
1 ln Ajt D −t

ln Ajt−1 − ln OAt−1 − zj

C 1 ln OA (4)
where the term between brackets on the right-hand side is the gap. The last term is
the rate of growth of the technology of the leader country. In the long-run the gap is
closed, which implies that we expect  to be equal to 1.
Parameter t measures convergence. We allow the speed of convergence to be
influenced by own R&D:
t D  C γ 1 ln njt (5)
where njt is the reciprocal of R&D productivity, measured as R&D-expenses over
GDP. The idea is that in order to adapt foreign technology, R&D is needed to upgrade
the skill-level of workers. It is likely that γ is positive, since doing R&D increases
knowledge, either intentionally or by coincidence. The term t is assumed to be posi-
tive. If a country j ’s technology is below average, then a positive value for t signals
convergence to the average. Other factors that may attribute to the process of adjust-
ment are simply captured by the constant term . One can think of organisational and
managerial factors and knowledge not embodied in own R&D and in patents.5
For practical purposes we quantify technology Aj by the number of patents and









The weighting scheme !j needs to be known a priori, and it is assumed that for the
countries considered here, the USA is the technological leader.
4Note that 0 < Ajt = OAt < 1, so that zj < 0.
5Here we take  to be constant across countries, so t differs across countries only because the
ratio of R&D expenditure over GDP differs. However, it may be reasonable to assume that that are
managerial differences and differences in educational and financial institutions between countries. For




In the next sections we describe the construction of the data and we discuss the es-
timation resultsfore presenting the data and the estimation results. But first we sum-
marize the model.
Summarizing, the model consists of the following equations:
g
j





ln Ajt−1 − ln OAt−1 − zj

C g OA;t (7)
t D  C γgjn;t (8)
g
j
n;t D gjD;t − gjY;t (9)
g
j
k;t D ijt −






Y;t D gjt C gjL;t (11)
The symbols have the following meaning:
A
j
t the level of techology of country j
OAt the level of techology of the leading country, here the USA
g
j
t growth rate of labour productivity of country j at time t
g
j
A;t growth rate of technology of country j at time t
g
j
k;t growth rate of physical capital in efficiency units of country j at time t
g OA;t growth rate of leading-edge technology at time t , here the USA
t speed of convergence of technology at time t
g
j
n;t growth rate of the reciprocal of R&D-productivity of country j at time t
g
j
D;t growth rate of R&D-expenses of country j at time t
g
j
Y;t growth rate of GDP of country j at time t
i
j
t ratio of investment over capital of country j at time t
g
j
L;t growth rate of employment of country j at time t
The first equation is the familiar log-linearized Cobb-Douglas production function.
The second equation describes the development of technological progress, which de-
pends on the technological gap with the leader. The third equation describes the speed
at which the technological gap is closed. These equations are the core of the model,
the other equations are identities. Substituting the identities and the convergence pro-
cess in the first two equations we arrive at two equations, one for the growth rate of
labour productivity and one for the growth rate of technology:
g
j
t D gjA;t C gjk;t
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j C gjA;t C gjL;t
i






















D;t − gjt − gjL;t
i 
ln Ajt−1 − ln OAt−1 − zj

Cg OA;t (13)
Equations (12) and (13) will be estimated, but first we take a look at the data.
4 Data
Testing formal models of the type presented in the prevous section requires accurate
data, on for instance physical capital, human capital, skills, and R&D, which often
are not available. Moreover, growth economists are interested in long-run develop-
ment for a broad selection of countries in different phases of economic development.
Measurement problems are huge, see for instance Griliches (1994), so we want our
model to be as simple as possible.
In the current section, we show the development of the economic variables in
equations (12) and (13) for the USA, UK, France and Germany in the period after
the Second World War. Total economy and manufacturing are compared as “sectors”,
as far as the data allow us to do so. Appendix A presents the original time series on
the variables and their sources. We constructed proxies for the economic variables in
order to estimate the effects of technological change on labour productivity growth
(Section 5). Appendix A shows a list of the empirical counterparts of these variables.
Figure 1(a) on labour productivity in the total economy shows that France caught
up with the USA during the period 1955 to 1991, while in 1955 it ranked lowest with
Germany. The French growth rate of labour productivity had always been positive in
this period, whereas the other three countries experienced some repercussions (Fig-
ure 1(b)). German labour productivity had also been increased fast, but it did not suc-
ceed yet in catching up with the USA in 1991. The Anglo-American gap remained
relatively constant during the period under consideration. In manufacturing, labour
productivity levels rose faster than in total economy (Figures 2(a) and 2(b)). Here,
France did not catch up with the American labour productivity level, as the USA were
developing as fast as France. Again, the UK lagged behind, with the gap to the USA
even widening, as Figure 2(a) shows. Comparing Figures 1(b) and 2(b), we observe
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Figure 2 Manufacturing, 1955–1991
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total economy, but fluctuating more strongly. Manufacturing industries are sensitive
to the business cycle, which find expression in the growth rates of labour productivity.
In total economy, other sectors like the service sector may meet a change in labour
productivity growth in manufacturing, at least partially.
Traditionally, physical capital accumulation had been assigned a crucial role in
economic development. Growth accountants like Maddison (1995b) devote much
time to the construction of data on capital stocks and investment in order to account
the share of capital accumulation in the growth of labour productivity. For both to-
tal economy and manufacturing, Figures 1(c) and 2(c) display the growth in gross
capital stocks. The growth patterns are rather similar, although the growth rates de-
clined faster in manufacturing. From these pictures, we can hardly draw unambiguous
conclusions on the connection between capital accumulation and labour productivity
growth. Only the growth rate differences between the countries are clear. Up to the
early seventies, Germany experienced high growth rates, whereas in the subsequent
decade, French rates were larger. The British capital stock grew less rapidly, but in
all three economies the growth rates declined over time. The American growth rates
are on the average low, especially in total economy before 1975, but the level of its
capital stock is relatively higher. Furthermore, the growth rates suggest that they go
up and down with the business cycles, like the labour productivity growth rates.
According to endogenous growth theories, of which one is discussed in Sec-
tion 2, technological development affects the national growth rates of labour produc-
tivity, and thus also differences between countries. Capital accumulation then plays
a supporting role. In our model in Section 3, technology is represented by cumu-
lative experience in creating new knowledge (proxied by business enterprise R&D-
expenditures) and the speed of convergence towards the leading edge technology
(proxied by patent activity). Figure 1(d) shows the change in (log-)levels of R&D-
expenditures from 1956 to 1991 in total economy, whereas Figure 2(d) shows us the
development in manufacturing. Unfortunately, no consistent time series on manufac-
turing R&D-expenditures before 1973 are available. Comparing total economy with
manufacturing in the period 1973–1991, we see that manufacturing R&D accounts
for a large part of total business enterprise R&D. The growth patterns differ slightly
between both “sectors”. Figures 1(e) and 2(e) display the growth rates of R&D net
of the growth rate of GDP (or value added). In total economy, French growth rates
of R&D were high before 1965, with Germany a good second. Figures 1(d) and 2(d)
show that the American-British R&D ratio remained constant, while Germany and
France caught up in some extent. In total economy, especially French R&D inten-
sity grew fast before 1965. The explanation for the fact that the American R&D-
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expenditures did not grow so fast may lie in its early development in this area. The
USA was the first Western country to start with systematic formal R&D, in the 1950s.
Furthermore, the pattern of growth in R&D seems to be sensitive to the business cy-
cle.
In Figure 3(a), the yearly numbers of applications in each country (both foreign
and domestic applications) are presented. Applications for patents are made by inven-
tors to the (inter-)national patent offices. The idea behind the use of data on patent
is that they contain technological knowledge. Particularly, patents are the outcome
of innovation processes, whether or not started with formal R&D, and theoretically
they should have an impact on labour productivity growth. Grants are those patents
(or new knowledge) that will effectively come into use, but grant numbers are more
often sensitive to bureaucratic procedures at the patent offices. Applications are no
patents yet (i.e. grants), but they reflect the extent in which a country is ready to gain
or adopt new knowledge.
The total number of applications represents also an element of international knowl-
edge spillovers. The countries under consideration are trading and communicating
with each other, so that their national knowledge is spreading to the other countries
in some way, either by trading goods and intermediates, investing abroad (capital
flows) or by political and individual networks. Patents applied for by foreigners are
also playing a role. Then a general knowledge pool emerges, which may have a larger
effect on the national growth rates of labour productivity than national expenditures
on R&D alone.
Figure 3(a) shows that, as one may expect, the number of patents applied for in the
USA by American and foreign inventors is clearly higher than those in the other three
countries. The USA is attractive to patentees as it represents a large, less or more, uni-
form market, where one may expect certain profits from the patent. Furthermore, a
nation’s total number of applications can reflect its relative strength in technology.
Particularly, it indicates a country’s ability to turn new knowledge locked up in ap-
plications into economic growth. As in the current paper, the USA are considered
as a “technological leader”. The innovative effort of American firms and individuals
is significant, although the share of foreigners had been increased during the period.
The Anglo-American gap is very large, but France and Germany do not perform
much “better”. The gaps with the USA had even widened between 1940 and 1991.
However, cumulation of patent numbers over a number of years is supposed to
reflect the knowledge level of a country more effectively, as yearly numbers are very
sensitive to the business cycle and some bureaucratic problems or measures, such as
the change in the international patent law in the 1970s. Furthermore, we assume that
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patents from years ago will take time to come into use as the knowledge in the patent
will have to be made concrete in products or production processes. So patents of, for
instance, 10 years ago can still have impact on today’s economic performance.
Figure 3(b) displays the resulting time series on the growth rates of the 10-year
moving sum of the number of applications in each country. All series show a clear
trend, with a decline starting already in the 1960s. The lowest point is reached be-
tween 1975 and 1980. The French growth rates are fluctuating more strongly, whereas
the American rates are on average lower.
5 Estimation results
In Section 3 the model is presented and the equations are derived. Below we present
the equations that are estimated. The first equation is the log-linearized Cobb-Douglas
production function (compare equation (12) above), where we added lagged produc-
tivity growth because of severe autocorrelation. Furthermore, we lagged the invest-
ment term for statistical reasons. This may be explained by a “time-to-build” argu-
ment: It takes some time for investment to become productive. The second equation,
which is the same as equation (13) above, describes the development of technological
progress, which depends on the technological gap with the leader.
g
j















D;t − gjt − gjL;t
i 
ln Ajt−1 − ln OAt−1 − zj

C g OA;t
The equations are estimated using (iterative) least squares on a panel of annual ob-
servations for both total economy and manufacturing. The countries considered are
France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The time
period considered is 1957–1991. In some cases the time period is shorter because of
lack of data, especially for manufacturing. The interesting parameters are the capi-
tal share in output  and the autocorrelation coefficient , and the parameters in the
technical progress function: , γ , , and z.
Table 1 shows the estimation results of the production function for both total
economy and manufacturing in the period 1955 to 1991 and 1974 to 1991. We present
two ‘periods’ in Table 1 because for manufacturing, it is namely only possible to
estimate the technology function for period 1974 to 1991.
From the estimation results presented in Tables 1 to 4 we can draw the follow-
ing conclusions. First, the fit is not particularly good for the productivity equations.




























10 year-moving sum of number of applications (growth rates)
Figure 3 Applications, 1940–1991
20
Table 1 Productivity: total economy and manufacturing (t-values between brackets)
Total economy Manufacturing
1955-91 1974-91 1955-91 1974-91
 0:08 0:08 0:57 0:58
.2:95/ .2:26/ .11:23/ .7:89/
 0:75 0:80 0:18 0:15
.13:75/ .11:19/ .2:97/ .1:64/
Observations 136 72 132 68
Adj R2:
FRA 0:15 - 0:43 -
GER -a - 0:47 0:32
UK - - 0:35 0:29
US 0:01 - 0:28 0:27
Durbin-Watson:
FRA 2:199 2:232 1:918 1:849
GER 3:019 3:212 2:688 2:911
UK 2:438 1:974 1:853 1:599
US 2:443 2:375 1:437 0:959
a: negative
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Table 2 Technology: total economy, 1957–1991 (t-values between brackets)











γFRA 0:27 −0:43 −0:42
.1:50/ .−1:07/ .−1:04/
γGER 0:21 0:63 0:23
.1:26/ .2:05/ .1:34/
γUK 0:24 0:76 −0:09
.0:87/ .1:24/ .−0:20/
 0:83 0:85 0:84 0:85 0:83
.10:56/ .14:40/ .9:86/ .14:62/ .10:00/
zFRA −0:64 −0:51 −0:65 −1:25 −1:25
.−6:37/ .−1:64/ .−5:67/ .−4:11/ .−4:02/
zGER −0:48 −0:52 −0:49 −0:43 −0:50
.−8:27/ .−3:46/ .−7:30/ .−7:06/ .−5:50/
zUK −0:45 −0:39 −0:45 −0:52 −0:52
.−5:27/ .−1:88/ .−4:63/ .−5:24/ .−18:61/
Observations 98 98 98 98 98
Adj R2:
FRA 0:45 0:48 0:45 0:53 0:51
GER 0:47 0:43 0:47 0:45 0:48
UK 0:48 0:40 0:48 0:41 0:52
Durbin-Watson:
FRA 0:321 0:473 0:325 0:717 0:693
GER 0:391 0:437 0:384 0:476 0:396
UK 0:193 0:236 0:191 0:231 0:166
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Table 3 Technology: total economy, 1974–1991 (t-values between brackets)











γFRA −7:89 −1:22 −9:34
.−2:77/ .−0:30/ .−2:54/
γGER −0:70 2:55 −0:75
.−0:77/ .1:65/ .−0:77/
γUK 1:64 2:03 1:46
.1:43/ .1:22/ .1:32/
 0:88 0:78 0:89 0:77 0:91
.12:49/ .12:51/ .13:75/ .12:48/ .14:00/
zFRA −0:83 −0:74 −0:87 −1:01 −0:85
.−37:40/ .−7:72/ .−40:64/ .−1:75/ .−43:43/
zGER −0:48 −0:46 −0:49 −0:46 −0:49
.−32:12/ .−20:18/ .−31:63/ .−24:68/ .−24:08/
zUK −0:59 −0:58 −0:58 −0:58 −0:58
.−41:06/ .−20:49/ .−51:75/ .−19:23/ .−42:10/
Observations 54 54 54 54 54
Adj R2:
FRA 0:65 0:53 0:77 0:55 0:78
GER 0:71 0:63 0:71 0:63 0:71
UK 0:81 0:71 0:83 0:70 0:83
Durbin-Watson:
FRA 0:346 0:256 0:514 0:199 0:580
GER 0:475 0:565 0:481 0:677 0:492
UK 0:484 0:395 0:663 0:389 0:645
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Table 4 Technology: manufacturing, 1974–1991 (t-values between brackets)











γFRA −3:27 −0:31 −3:70
.−2:08/ .−0:13/ .−1:52/
γGER −0:41 2:23 −0:72
.−0:66/ .1:83/ .−0:79/
γUK 3:45 5:76 4:21
.1:97/ .3:51/ .2:29/
 0:89 0:79 0:90 0:80 0:88
.12:13/ .14:57/ .16:34/ .15:56/ .16:57/
zFRA −0:83 −0:79 −0:89 −1:27 −0:88
.−36:62/ .−19:04/ .−21:00/ .−0:37/ .−16:80/
zGER −0:49 −0:46 −0:51 −0:46 −0:49
.−30:01/ .−32:36/ .−21:57/ .−24:38/ .−28:82/
zUK −0:59 −0:60 −0:58 −0:59 −0:59
.−39:65/ .−33:94/ .−65:33/ .−75:71/ .−70:08/
Observations 54 54 54 54 54
Adj R2:
FRA 0:66 0:51 0:71 0:55 0:70
GER 0:71 0:63 0:70 0:63 0:72
UK 0:81 0:82 0:86 0:85 0:87
Durbin-Watson:
FRA 0:351 0:332 0:703 0:255 0:687
GER 0:457 0:866 0:457 0:709 0:507
UK 0:501 0:795 0:836 1:403 1:069
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the whole period and 0.40 for the period 1974 to 1991, which is not unreasonable.
In previous empirical studies, such as Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), a share of
about 33 per cent is considered as the long run share of capital. However, the share of
capital in manufacturing is about 0.68, a very high value. The fit for the technology
equation is somewhat better for manufacturing compared to total economy. Second,
not all parameters are significant at a 5% significance level. More importantly, some
parameters do not have the expected signs.
More interesting are the estimations for the technology function. First, we discuss
the results for the total economy, for the periods 1955 to 1991 and 1974 to 1991.
Here, we present three estimation versions. One is with a common parameter for γ ,
measuring the impact of R&D on technological catch-up, for all countries considered
(column 1 in Table , measuring all other changes in knowledge not captured by
formal R&D activity. The second version is one equation in which γ is allowed to
differ between countries, whereas in the third version  has also cross section specific
values.
In total economy over the whole period, own R&D significantly affects the speed
at which countries adapt foreign technology, if we take a common parameter for
R&D. Leaving out the parameter  does not improve the results. When allowing for
country-specific coefficients for the R&D parameter, the fit is less good. Only for
Germany, when leaving out the  parameter, own R&D seems to have some effect on
the reduction of the technology gap with the USA (γ equals 0.63). In the period after
1974, this is valid for France (with γ equal to -7.89 in the third column of table 3
and -9.34 in the fifth column). However, the sign is negative, which is not what we
expected.
Other factors, captured by the constant term , that may influence the adjustment
process (see Section 3) seem to play a significant and positive role in the total econ-
omy only in the period 1974 to 1991. The negative effects of R&D in France are
partly compensated by these other factors.
For manufacturing there are some differences. As can be seen from Table 4, the
parameter γ , whether or not allowed to differ across countries, is only significantly
different from zero with a positive influence if  is excluded from the regressions.
However, if the parameter is country-specific, it is only significant for the UK. If  is
included in the equation, the French γ is again negative. In any case,  plays a role,
although less superior than in total economy.
In terms of our model we can conclude that technological divergence takes place
in France, while technological catch up is occurring in British manufacturing. R&D
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can contribute positively to technological catch up in the UK and Germany if we do












Technology gap with the USA
(difference in 10-year moving sums of number of applications, log-levels)
Figure 4 Technology gap vs. US, 1949–1991
The other parameter estimates are more consistent. For both total economy and
manufacturing parameter  does not differ significantly from 1 as was expected. Pa-
rameters z indicate the long-run technology level with respect to the US. In the the-
oretical model these relative technology levels were supposed to be constant in the
long run. From the estimation result in table 2 in column 1a, we can conclude that, in
the long run in total economy, France has a level of technology of about 53% (calcu-
lated as exp.−0:64/) of that in the US. For Germany and the UK these numbers are
62% and 64%, respectively. In the shorter period from 1974 onwards, these numbers
are about 44%, 61% and 55%, respectively (see columns 1a in Table 3 and Table 4).
These estimation results more or less are comfirmed with the data as can be seen
from Figure 4. Note that there are sharp differences in the data for the periods before
and after 1970. Before the early 1970s relative technology levels seem to converge,
whereas after 1970, relative technology levels more or less stayed constant or even
dropped a little compared to the US.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper we try to explain growth differentials across countries by technological
developments. It builds on recent endogenous growth models, which combine imper-
fect competition with innovations-based growth and learning-by-doing in innovation.
These forces generate spillovers from industrial research and patenting activity. Our
model is a multi-country, multi-sector model with international technology spillovers
and catch-up. The model is tested for the USA, UK, France and Germany using a new
set of panel data for the total economy and manufacturing in the period 1956–1991.
From the estimation results, which undoubtedly can be improved, we can draw
a number of conclusions. First, most of the parameters of interest are significantly
different from zero and have the expected sign. Second, technological development
in the form of the growth rate of R&D expenditures and the growth rate of the gap
with the technological leader USA appear to play a significant role in the explanation
of the growth rate of labour productivity. Third, international spillovers do occur
between the four countries under consideration, but they do not take place completely
and not immediately, so that productivity growth rate differences continue to exist.
Four, the R&D expenditures have an indirect and positive effect via the adjustment
of the gap with the USA. Domestic efforts to gain knowledge thus are important as a
learning mechanism for the adoption of foreign technology locked up in patents from
abroad. Five, the diffusion of knowledge from the USA to Germany, France and the
UK differ between the latter three, so the technological gaps also differ, and herewith
the growth rates of productivity. The technology gaps converge over time, implying
that knowledge diffuses only gradually and varies across countries, and that learning
takes time. Finally, it may be expected (from some earlier estimations not included
in this paper) that the results also differ between time periods, such as 1956–1973
and 1973–1991. Also the results differ if we compare the estimation results for the
economy as a whole and manufacturing. The major reason for these differences is the
difference in the estimation periods.
Despite our favourable results, one has to bear in mind that R&D-expenditures and
patenting activity do not capture all forms of knowledge. Think of tacit knowledge,
which is important in some sectors of the economy. Furthermore, organisational and
managerial knowledge are not accounted for. Human capital accumulation has only
been accounted for in the model implicitly.
To conclude, the results vary across countries, sectors and over time. This is con-
firmed by other empirical studies (as discussed in Section 2). Crafts (1997, p.64)
argued that “... success in “technology transfer” varied and seems to have been af-
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fected by institutional and policy differences...”. This corresponds with the concept
of “ultimate” causes of economic growth as defined by Maddison (1995a), and is also
discussed by among others North (1990), on reducing transaction costs, Abramovitz
(1991), on the residual as “our measure of ignorance”, and Olson (1982) on the im-
pact of political systems. The challenge lies in introducing these entities—which are
not easy to measure—in formal models of economic growth.
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A Data6
We have constructed proxies for both the total economy and manufacturing (the latter
as far as available) on the economic variables in equations (12) and (13). The original
data used for construction of these proxies are discussed below, whereas the resulting
time series are listed in Tables A.2–A.8. Note that total (gross) investment and capital
are the sum of non-residential structures and machinery and equipment. Furthermore,
the depreciation rate jt was assumed constant in the model discussed in Section 3.
However, with help of the data on capital stocks and investments, we made time
series on the depreciation rate, which we used in estimation. We used data on the
total numbers of applications in a country, assuming that this reflects international
diffusion of knowledge as foreign applications are accounted for. The proxies used in
estimation are:
 growth rate of labour productivity gjt D gjY;t − gjL;t , where
– g
j
Y;t D log-differenced GDP
– g
j
L;t D log-differenced employment
 growth rate of the reciprocal of R&D-productivity gjn;t D gjD;t − gjY;t , where
– g
j
D;t D log-differenced R&D-expenditures
– g
j
Y;t D log-differenced GDP
 growth rate of technology gjA;t D log-difference of 10-year moving sum of the
number of total applications in country j
 growth rate of leading-edge technology g OA;t D log-difference of 10-year mov-
ing sum of the number of total applications in the USA
 level of technology ln Ajt−1 D log of 10-year moving sum of number of total
applications in country j , lagged one year
 level of technology of leading country ln OAt−1 D log of 10-year moving sum
of number of total applications in the USA, lagged one year
6With special thanks to Bart van Ark (updated production and employment data), Angus Maddison
(standardised capital data), Bart Verspagen (updated R&D and patent data), and Jan Luiten van Zanden
(national patent office data).
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 growth rate of physical capital in efficiency units gjk;t D ijt − .jt CgjL;t /, where
– i
j
t D gross investment I / gross capital stock K
– 
j
t D .I − 1K/=K
– g
j
L;t D log-differenced employment
A.1 Output and employment
Data sources: Van Ark (1996, updated), OECD (1997b).
The time series for both GDP and VA in manufacturing are updated (production
census) series from Van Ark (1996, Appendix tables 1.2,1.3,1.8,1.9). These series are
in constant national prices, but not based on the same years. Table 3.4 from Van Ark
(1996) gives the National Account equivalents for the census data in the year 1975
and are constructed in such a way that international comparison is senseful (e.g.,
GDP and VA are all at factor cost, while the national census series are sometimes at
producer or market prices). Using table 3.4, the census series can be rebased to the
year 1975. As the data in table 3.4 are in mln US $, the PPPs given in table 3.3 can
be used to convert them back into national currencies. The scale factor is the ratio in
1975 of the current value of GDP or VA to the value at prices of the base year in the
original series, both in national currencies. After rebasing, the series are converted
into PPP equivalents. For GDP, GDP PPP in 1975 from OECD (1997b, table 3, p.
162) is applied, whereas the manufacturing VA time series are again converted with
the manufacturing PPPs as displayed in table 3.3.
In table 3.4 of Van Ark (1996), data are also given for the number of employees for
both manufacturing and total economy. These data are somewhat different from the
census employment data in 1975 (updated series from Appendix tables 2.2, 2.3, 2.8,
2.9), for the same reasons as above, namely that definitions of VA and employment
differ between National Accounts and national census series. Using the 1975 data on
employment in both table 3.4 and the census series, employment is rescaled.
A.2 Capital stocks and investment
Data sources: Kravis et al.(1982), Maddison (1995b), O’Mahony (1996), OECD
(1966, 1987, 1997b).
Time series for total economy on gross stock of fixed non-residential capital and
gross investment in 1990 national currencies at midyear are from Maddison (1995b),
tables 7 and 8 on Non-Residential Structures (NRS) and Machinery & Equipment
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(ME). Official data were standardised by Maddison with respect to asset lives and
retirement patterns. All asset lives are as closely as possible to those in the USA,
i.e., 39 years for NRS and 14 years for ME, and all assets are scrapped when their
expected life expires. The data were also corrected for war damage. With the 1990
price index for Gross Fixed Capital Formation (OECD, 1997b, table 34, pp.146–147),
the series were rebased to the year 1975. Data on prices before 1960 are indicated by
the price index on GNP (OECD, 1966, table on price index of GNP, p. 6). The series
were converted with 1975 PPPs calculated on the basis of data in summary tables
6.1 and 6.3 in Kravis et al. (1982, p. 167 and p. 179). Following Maddison (1995b),
the PPPs for NRS are a weighted average of the PPPs for Non-Residential Buildings
(lines 111–118) and Civil Engineering Works (lines 119–122), with the weights being
their per capita expenditures in national currencies. PPPs for ME are typed over from
table 6.3 (lines 123–144). In Table A.1 the resulting 1975 PPPs are displayed:
O’Mahony (1996) gives data on manufacturing capital stocks (to 1989), but no
investment data. However, from the conventional definition 1K D I − K, we can
derive that i −  D I=K −  D 1K=K D gK , so that we can calculate an approach
of gjk;t D ijt − jt − gjL;t . In Section 4, the growth rates of the capital stocks are
compared. It appears that the patterns do not differ too much. The original time series
from O’Mahony were in 1985 US $, and were converted back into national currencies
with the PPPs in OECD (1987), following the same procedure of calculating PPPs
for NRS as above, whereafter the series are rebased and converted into 1975 PPPs,
such as the series of Maddison.
A.3 Technology indicators
Technology indicators are the most difficult part of the data construction. In the cur-
rent paper, R&D expenditure time series and data on patent numbers are applied to
proxy the growth of knowledge in the economy.
A.3.1 Research and development. Data sources: OECD (1995b, 1997b), Verspa-
gen (1996, updated).
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The time series for Research and Development (R&D) in current national prices
for total economy were from updated data of Verspagen (1996), whereas those for
manufacturing were from the ANBERD database (ISIC-3) of OECD (1995b). Some
gaps in the series of Verspagen (1996) were filled with ANBERD data, as these may
not differ much from those of Verspagen. Only for the UK in 1970 and 1971 no
data were available. The ANBERD data for manufacturing are only available from
1973, whereas the Verspagen data run from 1956 onwards. In general, manufacturing
R&D appears to account for the largest part of total R&D expenditures in business
enterprise.
Both series are converted for each country into 1975 PPP $ using the 1990 price
index for GDP (OECD, 1997b, table 31, pp.144–145) and the GDP PPPs of 1975 in
table 3 on p. 162 in OECD (1997b). Special R&D price indices would be preferred,
as “such special price indices indicate a higer rate of inflation for R&D than in the
economy at large” (OECD, 1984, p. 309). So R&D growth rates calculated from time
series converted with GDP indices may appear to be too optimistic. The use of GDP
PPPs also reflect the relative purchasing power parties only broadly. Unfortunately,
R&D indices or PPPs are not available for the present.
A.3.2 Applications. Data sources: Deutsches Patentamt, I.N.P.I., OECD (1991,
1995a, 1997a), WIPO (1983).
The patent numbers are only on aggregated level. Data on manufacturing patent
activity must be available, but highly dispersed over national institutes. For the present,
we used the aggregated data as a proxy for the technology gap in manufacturing. The
sources for data on the total number of applications are:
 All countries from 1973 onwards: OECD (1991, table 20) for 1973–1974,
OECD (1995a, table 20) for 1975–1987, OECD (1997a, table 73) for 1988–
1991.
 France before 1973: I.N.P.I. for 1962–1972; WIPO (1983) for 1940–1961.
 Germany before 1973: Deutsches Patentamt for 1949–1972; WIPO (1983) for
1940–1943.
 UK and USA before 1973: WIPO (1983) for 1940–1972.
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Table A.2 Labour productivity
Total economy Manufacturing
USA UK France Germany USA UK France Germany
1955 12:85 7:38 5:88 5:70 11:83 5:35 4:77 6:28
1956 12:95 7:41 6:13 5:96 11:71 5:31 5:27 6:51
1957 13:11 7:51 6:40 6:18 11:84 5:43 5:42 6:75
1958 13:25 7:57 6:63 6:38 11:70 5:45 5:56 7:10
1959 13:77 7:81 6:90 6:79 12:47 5:76 5:77 7:72
1960 13:91 8:01 7:32 7:26 12:40 5:98 6:23 8:23
1961 14:17 8:08 7:64 7:49 12:77 5:91 6:50 8:47
1962 14:62 8:15 8:08 7:79 13:40 6:01 6:83 8:84
1963 15:13 8:37 8:38 8:00 14:36 6:35 7:17 9:07
1964 15:55 8:72 8:84 8:52 15:11 6:74 7:76 9:87
1965 15:97 8:87 9:19 8:92 15:73 6:87 8:25 10:44
1966 16:09 8:97 9:54 9:22 15:91 6:97 8:97 10:73
1967 16:13 9:32 9:97 9:53 15:68 7:24 9:48 11:09
1968 16:37 9:69 10:41 10:09 16:21 7:78 10:18 12:15
1969 16:42 9:86 10:94 10:67 16:32 7:98 11:08 13:03
1970 16:37 10:37 11:38 11:05 16:09 8:04 11:76 13:37
1971 16:73 10:37 11:89 11:32 17:10 8:27 12:33 13:60
1972 17:17 10:70 12:48 11:78 18:17 8:76 12:94 14:31
1973 17:41 11:05 12:93 12:25 19:05 9:41 13:55 15:13
1974 17:00 10:86 13:30 12:42 18:16 9:24 13:84 15:35
1975 17:04 10:72 13:43 12:61 18:36 9:04 13:93 15:57
1976 17:38 11:08 14:01 13:37 19:40 9:52 15:07 17:15
1977 17:57 11:34 14:34 13:76 20:07 9:63 15:70 17:40
1978 17:57 11:64 14:74 14:08 20:09 9:72 16:30 17:77
1979 17:39 11:84 15:23 14:45 20:08 9:75 16:99 18:44
1980 17:13 11:54 15:52 14:37 19:67 9:29 17:13 17:92
1981 17:26 11:82 15:80 14:45 19:91 9:72 17:57 18:07
1982 17:10 12:27 16:16 14:53 19:96 10:32 18:01 17:96
1983 17:50 12:80 16:32 14:97 21:62 11:26 18:45 18:83
1984 17:96 12:86 16:70 15:38 22:97 11:87 18:64 19:47
1985 18:28 13:17 17:05 15:62 24:01 12:23 19:08 19:90
1986 18:58 13:66 17:45 16:39 25:06 12:68 19:39 19:86
1987 18:73 14:05 17:77 15:86 26:52 13:43 19:71 19:46
1988 19:19 14:26 18:36 16:34 27:68 14:17 21:19 20:11
1989 19:14 14:08 18:86 16:69 27:49 14:71 22:16 20:51
1990 19:07 13:86 19:07 17:10 27:44 14:72 22:43 21:05
1991 19:08 13:99 19:21 17:49 27:39 14:95 22:37 21:53
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Table A.3 Output (mln 1975 PPP$)
Total economy, GDP Manufacturing, value added
USA UK France Germany USA UK France Germany
1955 834084 176990 116607 136129 201134 43392 21030 48794
1956 860143 179012 121354 146332 202942 43177 23014 52735
1957 874773 181422 127724 155050 204077 44138 24315 56332
1958 862934 180950 131698 161866 186272 43574 25157 59343
1959 917072 188300 135993 174399 207464 46194 25711 64957
1960 939418 196519 144248 189916 207877 49941 27883 73639
1961 958130 200401 150585 198550 208334 50024 29320 78050
1962 1009282 202757 159334 207381 226044 50240 31227 81740
1963 1055151 208733 166856 213343 243945 52296 33554 83354
1964 1107824 220035 177871 227386 261149 56425 37019 90748
1965 1171545 225652 185769 239524 283895 58298 39039 97656
1966 1235187 229632 194522 246732 305635 59363 42660 99344
1967 1266626 235125 203902 246748 304806 59762 44857 97122
1968 1318325 242980 212727 261401 320434 63689 47480 107191
1969 1358647 247079 227043 280925 329414 66151 53157 119723
1970 1351816 258649 239599 294626 311066 66550 57925 125799
1971 1379257 254933 251801 302984 316403 66284 61644 127128
1972 1450383 262525 265245 316360 344493 67881 65525 131266
1973 1531393 277540 278711 332604 381340 73405 70091 139651
1974 1521544 273787 288528 333320 363129 72528 72346 138285
1975 1499684 268559 288189 329289 336063 67468 70859 131760
1976 1568485 275222 302245 347163 368653 68817 75859 141846
1977 1640697 282063 311314 357788 395934 70099 78683 144461
1978 1721047 291305 320888 369115 413741 70437 80386 147215
1979 1767754 300596 330910 385289 424163 70308 82327 154520
1980 1752447 292344 337344 389137 401353 64208 81784 151561
1981 1782781 287796 341841 390826 404152 60356 81224 150055
1982 1746556 293325 350593 388238 377976 60484 81933 144793
1983 1808462 302336 353478 394236 401532 62218 82267 146748
1984 1940229 311577 358492 405680 448105 64606 80763 151046
1985 2018897 323137 364844 415065 464066 66330 80448 156264
1986 2087921 335484 374920 425295 478479 67193 80308 158469
1987 2163392 352284 383177 430458 507543 70708 79566 155384
1988 2278211 369577 399244 446975 541363 75683 84311 160289
1989 2324197 377032 415585 463331 538975 79076 88658 165786
1990 2346502 379275 424554 488805 531227 78919 90314 174874
1991 2332107 370692 427859 512147 511880 74657 88606 181401
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Table A.4 Employment (1000)
Total economy Manufacturing
USA UK France Germany USA UK France Germany
1955 64894 23977 19820 23867 16996 8115 4405 7773
1956 66417 24151 19802 24573 17337 8125 4369 8101
1957 66701 24148 19943 25089 17242 8130 4483 8346
1958 65111 23916 19862 25378 15924 7994 4523 8359
1959 66606 24113 19703 25684 16643 8027 4457 8416
1960 67542 24542 19705 26153 16762 8357 4473 8950
1961 67600 24787 19698 26517 16319 8462 4513 9211
1962 69020 24878 19722 26610 16871 8358 4572 9251
1963 69730 24928 19912 26673 16990 8237 4678 9191
1964 71235 25228 20132 26696 17278 8376 4771 9193
1965 73379 25432 20217 26848 18047 8484 4734 9355
1966 76772 25589 20384 26765 19205 8513 4758 9256
1967 78532 25220 20459 25893 19433 8255 4731 8759
1968 80524 25063 20433 25915 19769 8189 4664 8824
1969 82751 25071 20750 26319 20181 8293 4796 9191
1970 82569 24954 21055 26652 19337 8278 4927 9409
1971 82436 24592 21171 26760 18500 8012 5001 9347
1972 84456 24527 21261 26867 18959 7749 5062 9171
1973 87975 25113 21548 27160 20016 7798 5173 9231
1974 89482 25199 21691 26830 19998 7847 5228 9011
1975 88026 25055 21452 26110 18302 7467 5085 8460
1976 90253 24837 21569 25972 19005 7230 5034 8269
1977 93369 24867 21707 26009 19729 7279 5012 8302
1978 97935 25017 21772 26220 20599 7246 4933 8282
1979 101644 25394 21727 26660 21119 7214 4846 8380
1980 102277 25329 21735 27073 20403 6908 4776 8457
1981 103279 24346 21631 27044 20304 6209 4622 8305
1982 102154 23910 21690 26722 18940 5858 4550 8062
1983 103360 23629 21659 26342 18573 5526 4460 7792
1984 108010 24237 21469 26384 19509 5443 4333 7757
1985 110444 24538 21405 26581 19324 5425 4217 7854
1986 112361 24564 21489 25945 19094 5297 4141 7979
1987 115512 25077 21558 27144 19139 5263 4037 7984
1988 118734 25919 21750 27355 19559 5342 3979 7969
1989 121462 26780 22037 27754 19608 5377 4000 8083
1990 123072 27371 22265 28578 19358 5360 4026 8307
1991 122224 26496 22272 29290 18688 4993 3960 8426
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Table A.5 Gross capital investment (mln 1975 PPP$)
Total economy Manufacturing
USA UK France Germany USA UK France Germany
1955 106764 12904 8912 15762
1956 116372 14613 10308 18077
1957 122145 16187 12116 18437
1958 114568 17573 14272 19824
1959 126022 18070 16814 22887
1960 134023 20738 18858 26990
1961 135694 23541 22505 31178
1962 145214 23957 25798 35238
1963 155764 25105 29436 37545
1964 174457 29188 33855 43234
1965 203794 32064 36754 46295
1966 228438 34142 42073 47518
1967 233740 36736 46158 41770
1968 254406 39757 49220 44715
1969 278705 44021 57732 54652
1970 284601 46866 65512 70890
1971 297706 51068 73522 79400
1972 324231 57858 83704 81061
1973 382544 66707 95580 84294
1974 428850 79912 111202 84925
1975 435910 96147 121619 85535
1976 465314 113502 144499 91657
1977 540368 126256 155656 97991
1978 665843 145902 171794 107312
1979 787579 174322 197612 121738
1980 858102 196047 232787 134414
1981 958178 199126 253408 134231
1982 946778 215090 285098 131509
1983 929208 230861 297226 136364
1984 1074562 263501 310238 139770
1985 1194873 296232 342610 147587
1986 1185633 313862 375752 158100
1987 1208232 364355 408194 165143
1988 1288446 442428 466376 175705
1989 1389594 524368 514582 192569
1990 1414540 553936 552988 217758
1991 1331207 515160 565529 242685
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Table A.6 Gross capital stock (mln 1975 PPP$)
Total economy Manufacturing
USA UK France Germany USA UK France Germany
1955 1834491 161165 152800 169995 233279 40177 20988 40000
1956 1956144 179723 167459 188046 252767 44133 23186 45399
1957 2101360 196956 186470 206295 275488 47555 26267 50270
1958 2200247 218513 221022 231244 287823 51566 31529 56500
1959 2296672 234377 247319 252337 299087 54213 35621 61915
1960 2379576 250893 268144 281519 310136 57620 39305 70374
1961 2432080 274080 293822 325128 315251 63510 44343 82914
1962 2520641 295389 321568 377012 326064 68368 50218 97023
1963 2608649 322266 359411 422274 336608 74099 57959 108916
1964 2732405 345230 394794 467474 352903 79079 65557 120953
1965 2905645 377718 426858 514210 380523 86254 72227 133480
1966 3133329 413324 465735 564139 419518 93463 80202 146607
1967 3362179 441345 510196 591404 456788 97835 88482 152467
1968 3652438 482558 549368 629757 500914 105146 95812 161572
1969 4040723 532790 612954 706916 559973 114983 108224 182344
1970 4410481 602922 696962 855774 612907 129205 125111 222517
1971 4859151 692042 790339 983568 669762 145897 143884 255237
1972 5308405 799877 898351 1085939 725404 164966 164840 278263
1973 5884643 963644 1046101 1207161 797432 195081 193464 304936
1974 6868229 1224864 1307866 1358685 933197 244699 240356 337837
1975 8077663 1557443 1566716 1467506 1095500 306061 282352 359305
1976 8819735 1848068 1849770 1582201 1199093 356496 328937 382765
1977 9781748 2148855 2129985 1698556 1336852 408080 373402 406829
1978 11190314 2468146 2446637 1843165 1542179 463598 422786 435899
1979 12801002 2945739 2827896 2037028 1776066 547223 480325 475857
1980 14637368 3610646 3359798 2283057 2041025 657343 560601 526042
1981 16604433 4075809 3898029 2487841 2320612 720557 634490 562492
1982 18036774 4292110 4571679 2655221 2504649 736189 724893 586854
1983 18571006 4551940 5151575 2799303 2534518 755120 796798 605058
1984 19398763 4874945 5658253 2961864 2612531 783847 856400 625114
1985 20450485 5299049 6090588 3100970 2717507 827383 908474 641808
1986 21658128 5703611 6476446 3236906 2823236 862860 956442 658262
1987 22641024 6166967 6828075 3376182 2906041 904660 1000803 675452
1988 23931846 6829224 7232980 3534513 3039286 972420 1056804 694898
1989 25176048 7732180 7697250 3748327 3175269 1065135 1120677 723041
1990 26313382 8518217 8218567 4055846
1991 26945924 8869567 8809806 4377527
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Table A.7 Business enterprise R&D expenditures (mln 1975 PPP$)
Total economy Manufacturing
USA UK France Germany USA UK France Germany
1955
1956 3164 166 23 151
1957 3864 200 33 198
1958 4337 253 55 227
1959 4999 281 80 277
1960 5544 305 105 287
1961 5746 352 131 433
1962 6205 414 208 522
1963 6939 456 308 624
1964 7557 488 407 745
1965 8151 531 524 932
1966 9222 604 602 1072
1967 9949 752 705 1213
1968 11134 826 775 1367
1969 12274 927 957 1620
1970 12806 1091 2182
1971 13688 1300 2779
1972 15359 1435 1579 3104
1973 17747 1829 1868 3480 17151 1668 1742 3194
1974 20820 2434 2450 4030 20122 2220 2279 3775
1975 24187 3612 3213 4839 23471 3283 2983 4424
1976 28703 5185 4112 5391 27804 4675 3818 4961
1977 33865 6946 4963 6015 32777 6243 4617 5549
1978 40671 9202 6196 7375 39171 8320 5788 6896
1979 50824 13348 7964 9003 48777 12262 7407 8221
1980 64698 18530 10448 10051 62060 17224 9722 9368
1981 82569 22769 13981 11100 79531 21305 12955 10319
1982 99295 25997 18444 12626 95109 24398 16998 11730
1983 114771 28402 22443 13643 108903 26613 20763 12686
1984 136767 32677 27569 14647 127799 30558 25580 13746
1985 159351 38636 32998 17086 146650 35666 30580 16030
1986 170293 46300 37175 18649 155855 39942 34367 17595
1987 184102 51727 41134 20373 168432 44317 38134 19340
1988 203291 59937 46082 21715 179643 51959 42460 20820
1989 220722 70999 53142 23546 190752 61103 48918 22609
1990 235540 79964 60144 24870 200754 69893 55517 24362
1991 249405 81758 65551 27576 206780 70920 60398 26400
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Table A.8 Number of total applications
Total economy
USA UK France Germany USA UK France Germany
1940 60836 18254 7826 43479 1966 88525 58471 49486 67468
1941 52050 16847 11085 49855 1967 88164 59290 49341 67495
1942 44984 18642 14196 54386 1968 93471 61995 53656 65422
1943 44774 21944 14354 49060 1969 101415 63614 45393 66626
1944 54409 26200 11983 1970 103175 62107 47283 66132
1945 68052 35332 14856 1971 104729 61078 47971 65756
1946 81274 38181 23724 1972 99298 60281 47230 67354
1947 75669 35378 24768 1973 104079 60312 47234 66223
1948 68903 33626 22600 1974 102538 56250 43633 63545
1949 67811 33347 22441 76327 1975 101014 53400 40437 60095
1950 67556 31686 24800 130124 1976 102344 54561 39890 61705
1951 60670 30513 24377 60201 1977 100931 54423 39978 60401
1952 63391 33142 24198 59010 1978 101225 53751 40592 61304
1953 74036 36401 25861 60950 1979 101929 56159 43152 65060
1954 77503 37871 27823 59566 1980 106218 59643 45081 66768
1955 77502 37551 29051 54865 1981 108673 62356 47190 66926
1956 75211 39730 29047 53470 1982 112234 62721 47496 71262
1957 74298 40498 29512 53002 1983 106314 63207 49320 73288
1958 77629 42277 31448 54502 1984 114423 65936 53193 75326
1959 78708 44495 35315 56611 1985 116805 67409 54760 75681
1960 79721 44914 36446 57123 1986 122141 70116 57185 77408
1961 83396 46811 38310 58188 1987 133451 72700 60738 79050
1962 85180 49187 40063 59783 1988 146904 79968 66135 84923
1963 85869 51468 42449 61031 1989 161074 84788 72255 89656
1964 87592 53104 45286 64775 1990 175333 90978 78919 95164
1965 94629 55507 47793 66470 1991 176500 87608 76002 95193
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